


Book Synopsis

Drain the Defence Swamp: A Blueprint for Weapons Acquisition Reform

How to FIX Every Product Development to be more affordable, Producing and Problem Free

"If you've ever wondered why Defence programs are only ever a basket-case of continual failure and cost blowouts, this book will answer all of your questions!"



"The book that Defence does not want you to read!"

This first book in Gary's controversial "Drain the Swamp" Series will answer all of your questions and more. But you may not like the answers. Defence simply does not want you to hear them. Ditto for our politicians.

Read this book and discover for yourself the why and how of the low-performance, low competency 'Defence Status Quo' and its dismal implications for completely unaffordable cost blowouts and time delays while failing to deliver the promised capability to our Warfighters. Members of the Defence Establishment will tell you they have never heard any of this... with good reason. As Gary explains, "It is only now that I have fully retired from all defence work that I am free to expose the nakedness of both the Defence Emperor, and his Sacred Cows."

This book also offers a competent blueprint of reform that will easily overcome the ineptitude and deliver affordable and easily producible Defence Weapons systems, and finally drain this swamp of incompetence.

The solutions are easy - but will Defence even recognise they have a problem?

Gary D. Stewart has decades of experience in transforming complex business systems from icons of unaffordable, incompetence into efficient, inspiring, and effective ones.

He is a master teacher of reproducible excellence and high competency in systems thinking, innovation and product development processes and has worked alongside the leading thinkers in this field.

Gary's style is direct, his experience extensive, his insight prophetic. His books, speeches, and courses are for those who want the truth, not for those who abhor change and plain speaking.

How Defence Incompetence caused a diplomatic spat with the French President.

The 'French Folly', Polyploid Horses, going Nuclear, Defence Incompetence, Politics, and Pride

The 'French folly' was always going to be an *unviable polyploid horse**. No other outcome was ever possible from an incompetent Defence initiated and led program. An inept initial decision by defence in 2016 led directly to an inept decision by an inept prime minister of the time, which has come back to badly bite the current Prime Minister.

** **Polyploid Horse:** (book 4) Is an engineering metaphor for any unviable, dysfunctional system that delivers absurd or unwanted results. The unviable polyploid horse then becomes a virus that will subsequently infect every other system in the organisation. Such systems then become ever more dysfunctional and unviable with every passing year. It is the inevitable consequence of Bike-thinking (book 3) being applied to complex adaptive systems.*

Defence is especially adept at creating *unviable* polyploid horses in all weapons acquisition programs. Aided of course by approval of those unviable polyploid horses by inept politicians of the time.

1. The Global 'Bunfight' over Hurt National Pride and Submarines

What drove the change?

A deep dismay with the French Program and very likely unacceptable military outcome to Australia.

Why this timeline?

Sept 2021 was the best, cheapest, and most logical legal exit point from the contract.

What is the Alternative?

Revisit the CEP and start all over again.

Why Nuclear?

Starting over meant asking if nuclear is possible/feasible?

How could we do nuclear?

Only with a highly *competent* plan that specifically asked for USA help.

The China Syndrome

Deteriorating Global Politics facilitated USA/UK support for the nuclear option.

Australia, with the Right Plan, the Right Leadership and the Right Structure can achieve success. Defence is **not** a contender for any of those three things, and must be **completely excluded** from running the nuclear program.

2. The French 'Folly'.

In the book: Drain the Defence Swamp: A Blueprint for Weapons Acquisition Reform, this project was referred to as the "French Folly". A folly that was always going to fail. And fail it did, with spectacular political fireworks and damaged French pride. French pride is hurt, and they are truly masterful at exploiting hurt pride.

However, the French are just being, as the French so often are - supremely arrogant and dismissive of others. Despite their claims, they were given plenty of direct and indirect warnings about our unhappiness, but their supreme arrogance convinced them Australia would *never* cancel the contract despite all of the demonstrated problems and the likelihood of the submarine turning in to a dysfunctional, *unviable* polyploid horse.

As is usual for defence programs, the 'French folly' was a bad process run incompetently by Defence that arrived at it's inevitable outcome - lots of tears, and a vast waste of time and taxpayer money - just a little earlier than I expected. An inept *unviable* program, approved by an inept defence minister, and an inept prime minister.

As is usual for defence, they were naive in dealings with France and got suckered. France had their very best people doing the negotiation - we had mid-rank CASG officers with little real-world commercial or high-performance engineering expertise. The end result was almost inevitable from day one.

As is usual for defence, the French negotiators rang rings around CASG. This is precisely why there is so much confusion, different perspectives, and stories being espoused by everyone on both sides of the program.

Footnote: It is instructive to understand why the UK pulled out of the Horizon Frigate program with France in 1999. Any reading of the UK Parliament's reason for withdrawing will fill the reader with a strong sense of déjà vu that it could be almost word-for-word a description of what has happened between France and Australia on this program, with exactly the same result. (an unviable polyploid horse then - an unviable polyploid horse now)

3. Going Nuclear

While a major step-change for Australia, it is eminently possible with the support of the USA and UK. Of those, the UK is the closest fit to Australia, and the right timing, as they begin the next phase of development of their Astute Block 2 upgrade program. While the USA is a possibility, the likelihood is that they will want strict control of conformance requirements above and beyond what we need. However, the USA must oversee everything as they have the highest competency in this field.

It was not possible with the French due to their specific type of nuclear propulsion system.

4. How an Incompetent Defence will stuff it up. Again.

Most probably now that the basics of a competent plan has been made public – the wannabees and glory-seekers in defence who are without any high-performance competency will take over. (a direct repeat of the 'French folly') Most likely those who created the original nuclear plan have by now been moved aside or gone from the program.

This is entirely normal for our low-competency Bike-thinking defence leadership. Use those with some competence to create the plan - then move them all aside and replace them with the less competent glory-seekers once the plan is approved. This is precisely why no-one is ever held accountable for failure, precisely why no-one is ever in charge, and precisely why exactly the same mistakes can be made over and over again.

This is why the key failure mode in defence acquisitions has always been inept unviable plans due to a failure to adequately do a thorough, robust **contestability** of the plan in the first place, and then to incompetently execute that inept unviable plan. The normal result for defence acquisitions is always, a dysfunctional polyploid horse. Therefore, it is **NOT** a defence problem that needs to be FIXED. It is the lack of any high-performance Product Development competency that **MUST** be fixed if we are to make a complete success of the nuclear program.

That missing competency is why the Prime Minister is left standing naked, alone, and branded a liar when the music stopped. Defence is nowhere to be seen, never to take responsibility. Never to admit their own incompetence.

This is why defence alone is responsible for the entire 'french folly' debacle - yet defence is never, ever, held to account for their abysmal failures. Preferable that they throw the PM under the bus than admit incompetence.

This is why defence must have nothing to do with *building* the nuclear submarines.

The current Prime Minister needs to respond to the diplomatic spat by growing some balls, and brutally revealing the extreme ineptitude and incompetence of defence with a BOLD plan that will once and for all time FIX the *unviable* basket-case that is defence weapons acquisitions. (i.e. solve the right problem)

5. A High-Competency Solution. Right Plan - Right Leadership - Right Structure

The only *viable* solution to avoid a repeat of the 'French folly' is to remove the nuclear submarine program from defence, and establish it as a stand-alone development program of national importance.

Right Structure

The only *viable* way forward is to establish a National Submarine & Shipbuilding Authority (NSSA) along the same lines as how America runs such critical programs. The NSSA must report to the Prime Minister, with an indirect link to the defence minister and chief of navy.

Right Leadership

The NSSA must be setup under a single leader (like the USA) with the power to deliver the project on time and on budget. i.e. establish an NSSA "Tsar" for want of a better term. Such a leader must be able to put a baseball bat on the table to signify there is only one path and one agenda going forward – not 30 opinions with 30 agendas like the 'French folly'. No glory-seekers or wannabees allowed. Only high-performance competency permitted.

Right Plan

The plan being constructed over the next 18 months **MUST** be put through a very thorough robust contestability phase led by someone **other than defence** to ensure that the final decision is made based on a highly competent, high-performance easily executable strategy in the hands of others, without possibility of error.

6. What success looks like.

We already know what failure looks like (2 & 4 above). But what does success look like?

In the book: Drain the Defence Swamp: A Blueprint for Weapons Acquisition Reform; Success is always based on creating and establishing **Superior**, High-Performance, High-Competency, **Easily Executable Systems**.

That blueprint for reform described how to '*Drain the Defence Swamp*' via a bold and daring Weapons Acquisition Reform Program. Starting from product development SYSTEMS competency reform, process reform, structural reform, functional reform, to legislating the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act 2021 (WSARA-2021).

A Solution to the defence Swamp of Incompetence is easy: An NSSA built to a High-Performance Benchmark, highly competent, highly functional, highly effective, wholly fit for purpose, and wholly fit for office.

Aims:

1. A singular, deliberate focus on delivering absolute best capability into the hands of the Warfighter.
2. **Affordability** and **Producibility** as paramount mandatory considerations in every acquisition program.
3. Zero 'Projects of Concern' in future Weapons Systems Acquisition programs.
4. Zero possibility of any repeat of the 'French folly' problems in Weapons Systems Acquisition programs.

Ideal Success outcomes:

1. 30% less time to design, develop and introduce new Weapons Systems Acquisition programs.
2. 30% lower cost of acquisition of all Weapons Systems Acquisition programs.
3. 50% lower cost of sustainment and Thru Life Support/Ownership Costs in Weapons Systems programs.
4. 80% improvement in Producibility of Weapons Systems equipment.
5. 90% lower program risk in Weapons Systems Acquisition programs.
6. 100% of required Weapons System Capability in the hands of the Warfighter, and on time.

This level of success has already been delivered by others. There is absolutely NO reason why Australia cannot do the same on the Nuclear submarines if we are prepared to implement Superior **Easily Executable Systems** and legislate the necessary reforms as described in Part 2 of the book: Drain the Defence Swamp.